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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

PlaintiftfAppeiiees,

:

Case No. 990678-CA

v.
Priority 2-Appellant in Custody
:

SHANNON JESS ASHCRAFT,
Defendant/Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION
This is an appeal on behalf of Shannon Jess Ashcraft from a jury trial conviction of one
count of a violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-10-503(2), Possession of a Firearm by a
Restricted Person and one count of a violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-10-503(2),
Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a Restricted Person in the Third Judicial District Court, in
and for Tooele County, the Honorable Lee Dever presiding.
This Court obtains jurisdiction to review the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
§78-2a-3(2)(e) and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Did the prosecutor's argument during closing- instructing the jury to consider as credible
evidence an anonymous phone call alleging Mr. Ashcraft was driving around Tooele in a white
van, brandishing a gun- so prejudice the jury that despite the lack of sufficient evidence to sustain
a conviction, the jury round Mr. Ashcraft guilty?
A claim of prosecutorial misconduct grounded in improper argument by the prosecution
during trial is plain error when the trial judge fails to provide a curative instruction after proper

objection by defense counsel. Plain error in this case is the proper standard of review. State v.
Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 785-86 (Utah 1992).
Was there sufficient evidence to convict Mr. Ashcraft of possession of a firearm when he
did not have constructive or actual possession of the firearm? Was there sufficient evidence to
convict Mr. Ashcraft of possession of a dangerous weapon when he owner of the knife claimed
ownership of the weapon and testified that as a passenger in Mr. Ashcraft's vehicle he had
possession of the knife and Mr. Ashcraft did not?
Sufficiency of the evidence is a question of fact and this Court reviews the facts and
evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict and will reverse such a verdict only if that
evidence is so"inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v.
Souza. 846 P.2d 1313,1322 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant/Appellant Shannon Jess Ashcraft was charged by way of Amended Information
on August 31,1998 with Count I Possession of a Firearm by a Restricted Person, a second degree
felony in violation of U.C.A. 76-10-503(2) alleging Mr. Ashcraft possessed a Ruger Red Hawk
44 magnum revolver, and Count II Possession of a Dangerous Weapon by a restricted Person, a
third degree felony in violation of U.C.A. 76-10-503(2) alleging Mr. Ashcraft possessed a knife
(R. 1 &2).
A jury trial was held on September 22,1998 in which jury instructions given to the jury
provided:

that on or about June 10,1998, in Tooele County, State of Utah, the defendant,

Shannon Jess Ashcraft, while on probation for a felony, did have in his possession or under his
2

custody or control a firearm..[and] a knife....(R.35 & 36).
The jury found Mr. Ashcraft guilty of both counts (R. 3 & 39) and on November 23,1998
the Honorable Judge Lee Dever sentenced Mr. Ashcraft to a sentence of one to fifteen years in
prison for Count I and a sentence of zero to five years in prison for Count II with the sentences to
run consecutive to each other and to the one Mr. Ashcraft was currently serving (R. 44 & 45).
On December 3, 1998 defense counsel (trial counsel)fileda Motion for New Trial based
on the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments (R. 47). A transcript of the trial was
prepared and on June 28,1999 both sides presented argument before the trial court on the Motion
for New Trial (R. 58 & 65 & 89).
On July 26,1999 Judge Dever denied the Motion for New Trial (R. 96) and on August 4,
1999 the Notice of Appeal was filed by newly appointed appellate counsel at the direction of the
defendant (R. 97).
RELEVANT STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
There are no relevant statutes or regulations relevant to the issues raised on appeal other
than those jurisdictional provisions already cited in the brief.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 9, 1998 Officer Robert Eckman, a Utah Adult Probation and Parole Officer
assigned to Tooele received a telephone call in which an unidentified person claimed that Mr.
Ashcraft was driving in town brandishing a weapon (R.99, P. 50-52). Eckman and another agent,
Lonnie Walters, drove around Tooele that day looking for Mr. Ashcraft but did not locate him
(R.99, P. 54). After Eckman was off duty he went to Wal-Mart and saw Mr. Ashcraft pull into a
parking stall close to him. Eckman went home, got his gun and state car and called for a back-up
3

officer to assist him in stopping Mr. Ashcraft (R.99, P.55-56). Eckman approached the vehicle, a
white van, and told Mr. Ashcraft to exit the van (R.99, P.57). As a condition of parole-Mr.
Ashcraft could not refuse a search of his vehicle (R.99, P. 58). Mr. Ashcraft was in the driver's
seat of the van and Heather Johansen was in the front passenger seat (R.99, P. 57,59). During the
search of the van a knife was found between the seat belt and the drivers seat on the floor-it was
tucked between the seat belt bracket and the seat (R.99, P. 62).
In the glove box under the passenger's seat of the van a box containing 44 and 38 caliber
ammunition was found (R.99, P. 65). Mr. Ashcraft was arrested and taken to the Tooele County
Jail (R.99, P 65). After the arrest, Heather Johansen brought a bill of sale to the Adult Probation
and Parole office which states, "To Whom It May Concern, I Leo Andrews sold Bill Besmehn,
Ruger, Red hawk, serial number 500-00864, for the sum of $250, paid in full. Seller: Leo
Andrews. Buyer: Bill Besmehn." (R. 99, P. 69).
The second paragraph of the document states, "I Bill Besmehn, sold to Shannon Ashcraft,
Ruger Red Hawk, serial number 500-00864, for the sum of $300, paid in full. Seller: Billy,
Buyer: Shan Ashcraft, Date: 6-3-98." (R. 99, P. 69).
A gun was then introduced into evidence with the same serial number as the bill of sale.
Eckman obtained the gun and a hand written statement from Heather Johansen after Mr. Ashcraft
was arrested (R. 99, P. 70-72).
The handwritten statement is as follows, " To Whom It May Concern: I, Heather
Johansen, was with Shannon Ashcraft of the 3rd day of June 1998, when he purchased the Ruger
Red Hawk, serial number 500-00864, and a box of bulletsfromBill Besmehn. Shannon's friend,
Bill Besmehn, had told Shannon that he needed money to pay his rent for the month and asked if
4

Shannon would purchase the Ruger Red Hawk. Shannon and I both knew he was on parole and
could not have the gun in his possession. That is why the gun was taken straight to a residence
where we both felt comfortable leaving it. The gun was in neither of our possession until June 10,
1998, when I went and picked it up and handed it over to Officer Stidham. [signed] Heather
Johansen. June 10, 1998 (R.99, P. 72).
Another statement of Ms. Johansen reads: "To Whom It May Concern: I, Heather
Johansen, am writing this to let you know that Shan Ashcraft left his gun in my possession and he
never had access or never intended to have access to his weapon. (R. 99, P. 74).
At the time of the arrest, a passenger, Victor Lopez was seated directly behind Mr.
Ashcraft (R.99, P. 79). Victor Lopez told Eckman that the knife was not Mr. Ashcraft's knife but
belonged to Lopez (R.99, P.80). From where Mr. Lopez was seated, he could have placed easily
placed the knife or removed the knife from its location (R.99, P.80).
The ammunition was found under the passenger seat, under Heather Johansen, in a glove
box that slides out from under the seat (R.99, P.81). Eckman did not find a firearm on Mr.
Ashcraft or in the vehicle (R.99, P. 81).
Mr. Ashcraft did not own the vehicle-however he was sitting in the driver's seat when he
was stopped (R.99, P. 82).
Officer Mike Stidham of the Tooele County Sheriffs Department interrogated Shannon
Ashcraft at the Tooele County Jail after Mr. Ashcraft was arrested and placed on a 72 hold for
alleged violation of his parole agreement (R.99 P. 40-42). Officer Stidham testified that Mr.
Ashcraft told Stidham that he purchased the gunfromafriendand Heather Johansen had it (R.99,
P. 42).
5

Stidham called Heather, who then went to her mother's boyfriend's home where Heather
retrieved the gun. The gun was in a storage room, in the basement (R.99, P. 44, 109).
Bill Besmehn testified that he was longtime friend of Mr. Ashcraft and when Besmehn
needed money he sold his gun to Mr. Ashcraft. It was to be temporary, when Besmehn repaid the
$300.00 loan he would get the gun back (R.99, P.93-95). Bushmen wrote the bill of sale to Mr.
Ashcraft and received the $300 a day later. Bushmen paid his rent with the money and the next
day, the 4th, Heather Johansen picked up the gunfromBesmehn (R.99, P. 95-99).
Heather Johansen testified that she picked the gun upfromBill Besmehn on June 4th, 1998
(R.99, P. 108-109). She testified that Mr. Ashcraft did purchase the gun in a sense in as much as
he gave Besmehn $300 and the gun and bill of sale were collateral until the loan was paid off (R.
99, P. 108-110). Heather picked the gun upfromBesmehn and took it to her mother's
boyfriend's house where it would be kept (R.99, P. 110). Heather did not see the gun until Mr.
Ashcraft called herfromthe jail and told her to give it to Stidham (R.99, P. 111).
Heather got the gunfromher mother's boyfriend's house and took it to her house where
she hid it in the basement to keep it out of the reach of the children- until the police arrived (R.
99, P. 111). In fact the police had searched Heather's house prior to that and did not find the gun
(R.99, P. 112).
The night of the arrest, Heather saw Victor get into the van and he was holding the knife
(R.99, P. 113). Victor testified that he bought the knife at a swap meet and had taken it to a
friends house to show it to him. Victor needed aridehome and Mr. Ashcraft offered to take him
home the night of the arrest (R.99, P. 122-124).

6

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Mr. Ashcraft asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new tri^l. The
motion was based on two main points of contention; first, that the prosecutor made improper
statements and arguments to the jury during the closing. Second, that without the improper
statements there would have been no conviction for possession of the gun as there was insufficient
evidence to sustain such a conviction.
Finally, Mr. Ashcraft alleges that there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction
for possession of a dangerous weapon (knife).
The standards of review for the prosecutorial misconduct and insufficient evidence are set
forth above.
ARGUMENT
THE PROSECUTOR'S COMMENTS DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT
WERE SO PREJUDICIAL THAT NO CURATIVE STATEMENT BY THE
TRIAL JUDGE COULD CORRECT THE ERROR HAD IT BEEN GIVEN;
AND WITHOUT THE STATEMENT TO INFLUENCE THE JURY THERE
INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE DEFENDANT.
Trial counsel brought a Motion in Liminie the morning of trial seeking to limit the
testimony of Officer Eckman and the contents of Eckman's report (R.99, P. 1,2,3,4). The
information counsel sought to keep out of trial was the information of the anonymous phone call
that Eckman received which implicated Mr. Ashcraft was violating his parole agreement (R.99, P.
2,3). Trial counsel argued that as the caller would not provide her identity, the statements were
hearsay, could not be verified nor corroborated and the information was highly prejudicial and
that Eckman should not be allowed to divulge the contents of the phone call (R.99, P. 1-4). The
7

trial judge ruled that without knowing about the call and its contents that the jury would be
confused as to the motivation of Eckman to look for Mr.. Ashcraft. On that basis the judge
denied defense counsel's motion in allowing the statement in for foundational purposes only
(R.99, P. 4-5).
Although the phone call is mentioned several times in Eckman's testimony, in closing the
prosecutor used the testimony and expanded it into a highly prejudicial statement:
"Now the defendant makes a point on cross-examination that the person who called in the
tip that Shannon was brandishing a firearm, or threatening people with it when he was in the white
van, didn't leave a name. And of course if a person leaves their name we're going to give them a
little more credibility than someone who doesn't. But put yourself...
{Mr. Freestone begins speaking} Your honor, I'm going to object to this-to this closing
statement regarding the statement of the unidentified person. The reason that was admitted, if
you recall, was for foundation, not for truth of the matter asserted. At this point, he's arguing
that truthful matter asserted.
{Judge Dever begins speaking} Well, ladies and gentlemen....
{The prosecutor interrupts the court} I don't think I'm doing that your honor, that's not
my intent.
{The trial Judge} This statement that was admitted was not admitted for the truth or
falsity of the statement, but simply as a basis for the position that Mr. Eckman took, and the
actions he took. And that [is] all it is to be considered for, and for no other reason.
{The prosecutor finishes} In other words, we're not alleging that Shannon was actually
brandishing the firearm, because we didn't have anybody who saw him do that. We don't have
8

that person's name. But, because of that tip, we wanted to find Shannon Ashcraft, andfindout
what he was doing and why he-whether, in fact-he had a gun. And that all thats information was
being admitted for. Its to lay a foundation as to why Officer Eckman went out looking for him.
However, that tipster's information was verified in two regards. First, Shannon was in fact
driving a white van. And second of all, Heather gives the officer a bill of sale which she got out
of the glove box apparently, showing that Shannon in fact did have a gun. So we submit that the
tipster's information was verified after the fact (R.99, P. 156).
The trial judge never made any curative comment, instruction or remark after this
damaging and improper statement of the prosecutor.
Mr. Ashcraft contends that the prosecutor's remarks regarding the tipster's call and his
opinion about aspects of the call being bolstered or corroborated makes the testimony regarding
the call-testimony that was introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. Such commentary on
the tip during closing argument brought evidence and information to the jury that would have
been inadmissible at the evidentiary stages of the trial.
The prosecutor acknowledged to the jury that the information should not be looked at for
its truthfulness-only why Eckman was looking for Mr. Ashcraft-then the prosecutor goes ahead
and does exactly what he was not supposed to do-use the information for the truth of the matter
asserted (that Mr. Ashcraft was driving around town brandishing a gun).
On pagel55, lines 20-25 and page 156 line 1 the prosecutor tells the jury that the call was
corroborated and verified after the fact. This statement to the jury tells the jury that Mr. Ashcraft
was indeed brandishing (possessing) a gun. Without that statement there is no witness testimony
or evidence that Mr. Ashcraft ever had actual possession of a gun.
9

The evidence of constructive possession of the gun was insufficient to support a guilty
verdict in that Heather testified that she picked up the gunfromBill Besmehn and she took it to
her mother's boyfriend's home for safekeeping. Heather testified she retrieved the gun and took
it to her house to give to the police only after Mr. Ashcraft was in custody. Bill Besmehn
testified he gave the gun to Heather, he never gave the gun to Mr. Ashcraft. Officer Eckman
testified that he never saw Mr. Ashcraft with the gun or any gun.
The only way a verdict of guilty for constructive possession can be legitimately found
(without the prosecutor's remarks) is tofindthat Mr. Ashcraft's purchase of the gun was
constructive possession. However, Utah law has a statute specifically in place for such an act and
Mr. Ashcraft was not charged with that statute. (76-10-503(3)).
The only evidence of constructive possession produced at trial was the sale/purchase of
the gunfromBesmehn to Ashcraft. There was no testimony that Ashcraft held the gun, possessed
the gun or ever intended to do so. Nofingerprintevidence was introduced at trial to show Mr.
Ashcraft held the gun.
Indeed, Heather and Bill Besmehn testified Mr. Ashcraft never held the gun-he bought it
as a favor to Besmehn so he could use the $300 to pay rent.
In order to show constructive intent the prosecution had to show that the defendant had
both the power or the authority AND the intent to exercise domain over the gun (R. 28).
Although by buying the gun Mr. Ashcraft may have had the ability to have the power to
possess the gun-he never was able to because either Besmehn or Heather had the gun out of the
control of Mr. Ashcraft. Heather and Besmehn never let Mr. Ashcraft have the gun. Finally, the
prosecution had to show that Mr. Ashcraft also had the intent to possess the gun.
10

To show the intent to possess the prosecution must show intent by direct, positive
evidence (R.28). No direct, positive evidence other than the bill of sale was introduced at trial.
The bill of sale is only evidence of a purchase (covered elsewhere by Utah law) it is not evidence
of possession. Indeed all witness testimony was that Mr. Ashcraft knew he could not possess a
gun and was helping Besmehn out financially and therefore Heather is the only person who held
the gun.
Mr. Ashcraft contends that as there was no actual possession and insufficient evidence to
support afindingof constructive possession of the gun, the only way a jury could have found guilt
was based on the prosecutor's improper statements about the tipster's call being verified and true.
When a prosecutor makes a clearly improper remark at trial and there is no curative
instruction or an insufficient curative admonition this Court must decide if absent the improper
statements if the jury verdict would be different.
In State v. Saunders, 371 Utah Adv. Rep. 6,7-8 (Utah 1999), the Utah Supreme Court
held that whether or not the evidence is properly admitted or not (in this case the statement
admitted to prove the truth of the matter asserted rather than as foundation) a new trial may be
warranted.
" This is true regardless of whether that evidence was properly or erroneously admitted. A
prosecutor who intentionally calls to jurors' attention matters that they should not consider in
reaching a verdict is clearly guilty of misconduct, particularly when a prosecutor argues prior bad
acts or prior criminal conduct as a basis for convicting. See State v. Emmett 839 P.2d 781,
785-86 (Utah 1992); State v. Tarafa, 720 P.2d 1368,1372-73 (Utah 1986)."
In this case the prosecutor called the jury's attention to the citizen caller's statements that
11

Mr. Ashcraft had a gun, was brandishing the gun and driving around town in a white van. He
went on to assert that as Mr. Ashcraft was driving around in a white van and there was a bill of
sale for a gun and therefore, Mr. Ashcraft must have had possession of a gun.
"The test for determining whether a prosecutor's statements in closing argument are
improper and constitute error is whether his remarks "call [ ] to the jurors' attention matters which
they would not be justified in considering in reaching a verdict." State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750,
754 (Utah 1982).
"[A prosecuting attorney] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to
govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the
law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is
not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a
just one." State v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 785-86 (Utah 1992) (quoting Berger v. United States.
295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)).
Considerable latitude is allowable in closing argument. Counsel may discuss fully both the
evidence and all legitimate inferences arisingfromthe evidence. Such argument may merit
reversal if (1) the remarks called to the jurors' attention matters which they would not be justified
in considering in reaching a verdict, and (2) under the circumstances, the jurors were probably
influenced by the remarks Id (quoting State v. Valdez. 30 Utah 2d 54, 60, 513 P.2d 422, 426
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(1973).
"This Court has established a test to determine whether a prosecutor engaged in
misconduct and whether that misconduct constitutes reversible error. A prosecutor's actions and
remarks constitute misconduct that merits reversal if the actions or remarks call to the attention of
the jurors matters they would not be justified in considering in determining their verdict and,
under the circumstances of the particular case, the error is substantial and prejudicial such that
there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more favorable result
for the defendant." State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987), (rehrg. denied 1988).
Once this Court determines that a prejudicial and improper argument was made, this Court
must look at whether a sufficient curative instruction was given (here none was given after the
second and most damaging statement). The Court then determines if the jury most likely was
impacted by the improper statements and then the Court must decide if based on all the other
evidence presented at trial if the result would have still been a conviction.
Here the statement is clearly prejudicial and no curative instruction was given to the
jury despite the objection by trial counsel to the statements. At issue now is wether there was
sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction 1) for the gun charge; absent the prejudicial statements
and 2) for the knife charge based on the testimony and evidence presented.
In State v. Longshaw.961 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1998), this Court found that the
prosecutor misstated the law therefore making improper remarks in closing arguments. However,
once that finding has been made the issue becomes whether absent the remarks a different result
would have occurred.
"Finally, step two of the prosecutorial misconduct test requires "consideration of the
13

circumstances of the case as a whole. In making such a consideration, it is appropriate to look at
the evidence of defendant's guilt." (citations omitted} Thus, "c[i]f proof of defendant's guilt is
strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed prejudicial.'Likewise, in a case
with less compelling proof, [an appellate court] will more closely scrutinize the conduct." Id., at
931.
In Mr. Ashcraft's case there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and absent
the statements of the prosecutor- that a citizen had seen Mr. Ashcraft not only in possession of a
gun but brandishing it while driving around town-there is no other evidence or testimony to show
Mr. Ashcraft possessed a gun.
The testimony presented was that Mr. Ashcraft never had the gun, nor did he intend to have
the gun. He paid money for it to help out hisfriendbut never intended to touch the weapon.
Only Heather had constructive or real possession of the gun.
Stemming from the issue of prosecutorial misconduct is the argument that absent the remark
there is insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction.
In Longshaw this Court held:
"Because we owe "broad deference to the fact finder, [our] power to review a jury verdict
challenged on grounds of insufficient evidence is limited." State v. Souza, 846 P.2d 1313, 1322
(Utah CtApp. 1993). Accord State v. ScheeL 823 P.2d 470.472 (Utah CtApp.1991). We
review the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawnfromthat evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury's verdict and reverse[ ] only if that evidence is so " 'inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which [she] was convicted.'"
14

(citation omitted).
In this case Mr. Ashcraft asserts that more than mere contradictory evidence was presented
to the jury. He claims that NO evidence of actual possession of the gun was provided. He
contends that any evidence of constructive possession of the gun (the bill of sale) was squarely
negated by Heather Johansen and Bill Besmehn's testimony that he never intended to have the
gun.
Lastly, Mr. Ashcraft asserts that he never had actual or constructive possession of the knife.
The knife was placed in a spot in the van where Victor put it. Heather saw Victor take the knife
into the van. Victor testified it was his knife, he bought it at the swap meet and that in no way
did Mr. Ashcraft ever have it or intend to have it.
Even officer Eckman testified that the knife was located where Victor could easily reach it
and have access to it. There is no evidence that Mr. Ashcraft took the knife into the van or ever
held the knife. Nofingerprintsof Mr. Ashcraft on the knife were presented at trial. The only
connection between Mr. Ashcraft and the knife is that both were in the van at the same time.
Such testimony is not mere contradictory evidence with conflicting inferences, it shows that
without the misconduct of the prosecutor-no conviction would be warranted.
PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Counsel does not request oral argument or a published opinion in this case.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Ashcraft respectfully asks this Court to reverse his conviction and remand the case back
to the trial court where he can be given a new trial without the prosecutor's harmful and
prejudicial remarks swaying the jury into an unwarranted conviction.
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Signed and Dated this L5th Day of November, 1999.
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